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A BEHAVIORAL ANALYSIS OF
PRIVATE JUDGING
CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL*
I
INTRODUCTION
A commonly cited reason that businesses include arbitration clauses in their
contracts with consumers is to avoid jury trials.1 From the perspective of businesses, replacing a jury with an arbitrator “provides much-needed protection
from the unpredictability of jury awards, which, in recent years, have been
known to reach astronomical heights—awards that appear inappropriate even
to the most objective observer.”2 From the perspective of consumer advocates,
businesses choose arbitration to “decrease their likely payout” by avoiding
juries, which they believe “will often be sympathetic to the claims of a consumer
against a large company.”3 Underlying these competing perspectives are differing views of jury and arbitral decisionmaking. From the business perspective, juries make awards that are “too high” and thus overcompensate consumer
claimants. From the consumer advocates’ perspective, arbitrators make awards
that are “too low” and thus undercompensate consumer claimants.
Stated otherwise, a central issue in the debate over predispute consumer
arbitration clauses is whether juries or arbitrators make “better” decisions—
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1. E.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference
for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 684 (1996) (“One of the company’s chief goals in selecting
arbitration over litigation is generally to avoid a jury trial.”). There are, of course, a number of other reasons businesses might include predispute arbitration clauses in their standard-form contracts, such as confidentiality, reduced availability of class relief, and so on.
2. Martin J. Oppenheimer & Cameron Johnson, A Management Perspective: Mandatory Arbitration
Agreements Are an Effective Alternative to Employment Litigation, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1997, at 19;
see Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Alternative to Litigation Attracting Consumer Financial Services
Companies, in ARBITRATION OF CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES DISPUTES 845-48 (Alan S. Kaplinsky
ed., 1999) (stating that arbitration “eliminates irrational jury verdicts”).
3. Sternlight, supra note 1, at 684; see Margot Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and
Appropriate Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 137 (2002) (“Creditors use arbitration clauses
as a shield to prevent homeowners from litigating their claims in a judicial forum, where a consumer
friendly jury might be deciding the case.”); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 60
(arguing that businesses “prefer arbitration to litigation for their patterned, repetitive disputes with minor
players” because of “[l]ower damage awards” in arbitration).
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that is, which decisionmaker more accurately assigns liability and awards damages given the facts of a case and the governing legal standards. This issue is
necessarily a comparative one, as no legal decisionmaker is infallible.4 A full
comparison of jury and arbitral decisionmaking is well beyond the scope of this
Article. Instead, this Article focuses on an aspect of arbitral decisionmaking
that has been largely unexamined: the extent to which decisionmaking by arbitrators is affected by heuristics (“rules of thumb”) and cognitive biases.5
Much attention has been given to how such “cognitive illusions” affect decisionmaking by juries. The experimental results have been summarized as follows:
Decades of research on juries indicates that cognitive illusions adversely affect the
quality of adjudication. Researchers have found, for example, that juries believe that
litigants should have predicted events that no one could have predicted, allow irrelevant or inadmissible information to influence liability determinations, defer to arbi6
trary numerical estimates, and rely on incoherent methods to calculate damages.

Less, albeit increasing, attention has been given to how cognitive illusions affect
decisionmaking by judges. The experimental studies to date, while mixed, have
found that judges are less affected by some cognitive illusions, but similarly
affected by others.7
Almost no attention, however, has been given to how cognitive illusions
might affect arbitral decisionmaking.8 This Article extends the behavioral
4. See Robert MacCoun, Inside the Black Box: What Empirical Research Tells Us About Decisionmaking by Civil Juries, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 164 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993)
(“Several legal scholars have pointed out that the appropriate standard by which to evaluate the quality of
jury performance is not some absolute benchmark of perfection, but rather the performance of the most
likely alternative factfinder, the trial judge. Or, to extend the argument, the arbitrator, or the expert tribunal.”).
5. See generally HEURISTICS AND BIASES: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF INTUITIVE JUDGEMENT (Thomas
Gilovich et al. eds., 2002); JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and
Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974). For overviews of the literature from a legal perspective, see, for example, BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000); Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral
Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen,
Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L.
REV. 1051 (2000); Donald C. Langevoort, Behavioral Theories of Judgment and Decision Making in Legal
Scholarship: A Literature Review, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1499 (1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Law and
Economics: A Progress Report, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 115 (1999). For a cautionary view, see Gregory
Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously? The Unwarranted Pessimism of the New Behavioral Analysis of Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1907 (2002) [hereinafter Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?]; Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for
Behavioral Law and Economics’ Equal Incompetence, 91 GEO. L.J. 67 (2002) [hereinafter Mitchell, Equal
Incompetence].
6. Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 777, 780-81 (2001).
7. See infra Part III.B.1.
8. The effect of cognitive illusions on consumer decisionmaking has been cited as a possible justification for increased regulation of predispute arbitration clauses in standard-form contracts. Sarah Rudolph
Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements
Between Employers and Employees, 64 U. MO. K.C. L. REV 449, 482 (1996); Sternlight, supra note 1, at
692-93. A central question is the extent to which market forces may protect consumers who, for whatever
reason—cognitive illusions, high information costs, and so forth—do not protect themselves. Christopher
R. Drahozal, “Unfair” Arbitration Clauses, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 695, 765-66. The mere presence of an
arbitration clause in a consumer contract does not necessarily mean that the business drafting the contract
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analysis of the legal system9 to private judging, and considers the implications of
that analysis for the debate on predispute consumer arbitration clauses.
Empirical evidence on the effect of cognitive illusions in arbitral decisionmaking is extremely limited. Further complicating the analysis of private judging
are structural differences between arbitration hearings and jury trials that may
heighten or dampen the effect of cognitive illusions on decisionmaking in the
real world. Nevertheless, assuming arbitrators are more like judges than jurors
in their decisionmaking—a seemingly reasonable assumption—studies comparing the effect of cognitive illusions on judges and jurors provide at least a
starting point for making predictions about arbitral decisionmaking. On this
view, this Article tentatively concludes that, like judges, arbitrators may be less
susceptible to at least some cognitive illusions than are jurors.
If subsequent research bears out this tentative conclusion, it would have
important implications for the ongoing debate over consumer arbitration. If
arbitral decisionmaking is less subject to the effects of cognitive illusions than
jury decisionmaking, then the use of arbitration may improve the accuracy of
dispute resolution, reducing the risk of overcompensation rather than resulting
in undercompensation.10 This is not to suggest that utilitarian arguments about
the nature of legal decisionmaking should be used to override constitutional
protections,11 or that juries might not serve other functions beyond dispute
resolution.12 Instead, the point is simply that when Congress and other policymakers consider whether to restrict the enforceability of consumer arbitration
agreements, they should not assume that juries necessarily make “better” decisions than arbitrators.

is taking advantage of the consumer. Limitations on consumer decisionmaking, such as cognitive biases
and the use of heuristics, while certainly one consideration in evaluating whether the use of arbitration
benefits or harms consumers, are by no means the only one. One often overlooked consideration is the
extent to which business reputation and similar market sanctions may counteract the take-it-or-leave-it
nature of many consumer form contracts. Id. at 767-69; see RICHARD CRASWELL & ALAN SCHWARTZ,
FOUNDATIONS OF CONTRACT LAW 322-23 (1994) (“Sellers who use unreasonable terms get a reputation
for having undesirable contracts.”).
9. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The “New” Law and Psychology: A Reply to Critics, Skeptics, and Cautious Supporters, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 739, 739 (2000) (noting that the field is variously referred to as “the
psychology of judgment and decision-making,” “behavioral economics,” and “behavioral decision
theory”).
10. Even if arbitral decisionmaking is comparable only to jury decisionmaking, this would indicate
that some criticisms of consumer arbitration are overstated.
11. See Sternlight, supra note 1, at 733 (“Whatever the arguable benefits of binding arbitration over
litigation, our Constitution states that jury trials are to be preferred over arbitration.”). For discussions of
jury-trial rights and arbitration, see id. at 671; Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the
Demise of the Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 669 (2001)
[hereinafter Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration]; Jean R. Sternlight, Rethinking the Constitutionality of the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration: A Fresh Assessment of Jury Trial, Separation
of Powers, and Due Process Concerns, 72 TUL. L. REV. 1, 76-78 (1997).
12. E.g., ELLEN E. SWARD, THE DECLINE OF THE CIVIL JURY 51-64 (2001) (discussing the political and socializing roles of juries); VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 249 (1986)
(“[P]olitical functions of the jury are not to be ignored. They coexist with the fact-finding functions and
should be considered in judging the jury’s role in society.”).
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Part II provides an overview of cognitive illusions relevant to decisionmaking by judges, jurors, and arbitrators. Part III summarizes empirical studies that
shed light on the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitral decisionmaking. Part
IV examines structural differences between jury decisionmaking and arbitral
decisionmaking that may increase or decrease the effect of cognitive illusions.
Part V concludes with a call for more research.
II
HEURISTICS AND COGNITIVE BIASES:
AN OVERVIEW AND APPLICATION TO JURORS
Experimental studies suggest a number of ways in which human behavior
systematically departs from a rational-actor model. This Part describes several
such “cognitive illusions”—hindsight bias, anchoring, the representativeness
heuristic, and extremeness aversion—and examines their application to legal
decisionmaking, particularly by jurors.13 Certainly there is reason to be cautious
about applying laboratory results to real-world settings. But given how juries
are selected and jurors’ freedom from market incentives, if any legal decisionmaker is susceptible to cognitive illusions, the jury seems the most likely, even
taking into account institutional devices for lessening their influence.
A. An Overview of Heuristics and Cognitive Biases
1. Hindsight Bias
“Hindsight is 20/20,” the saying goes. Once people know that an event has
occurred, it is extremely difficult for them to ignore that occurrence when
evaluating the probability that the event would occur in the first place.14 As
Baruch Fischhoff explains:
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight. They not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but
also to view it as having appeared “relatively inevitable” before it happened. People
believe that others should have been able to anticipate events much better than was
actually the case. They even misremember their own predictions so as to exaggerate
15
in hindsight what they knew in foresight . . . .

13. Cognitive biases are psychological “biases and aversions that can lead [people] to inaccurate
perceptions of facts.” Sunstein, supra note 5, at 135. Heuristics are “mental shortcuts” that are often
useful but sometimes result in mistaken decisions. See Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165, 1165 (2003); Sunstein, supra note 5, at 139 (“Heuristics are not biases, and often they are good, because they economize on decision costs; but they can lead
to several mistakes.”). I use the phrase “cognitive illusions” to refer collectively to cognitive biases and
heuristics.
14. E.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 799-801; Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1523-27; Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 571, 576
(1998).
15. Baruch Fischhoff, For Those Condemned to Study the Past: Heuristics and Biases in Hindsight,
in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 5, at 335, 341.
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Of course, not all uses of hindsight in decisionmaking are inappropriate.16 If
people learn by experience, one would expect them to increase their estimates
of the probability of future events based on past events. Moreover, “the fact
that something happened provides some information about the risky behavior.”17 “Hindsight bias” occurs when the influence of hindsight on judgment
exceeds that which is justifiable.
Experimental studies have found hindsight bias in a variety of decisionmaking settings.18 For example, Kim A. Kamin and Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
administered a problem based on the well-known tort case of In Re Kinsman
Transit Co.19 to a group of experimental subjects.20 In Kamin and Rachlinski’s
study, subjects in the “foresight condition” were asked to determine whether
the risk of a flood was such that the city should hire a bridge operator during
winter months when the drawbridge was not used. Subjects in the “hindsight”
condition were told that hiring a bridge operator could have prevented debris
from becoming lodged under the bridge and causing a flood. Both were asked
to decide whether the city should have hired a bridge operator.21 Only 24% of
the subjects in the foresight condition required the city to hire a bridge operator, while 57% of the subjects in the hindsight condition held the city liable for
failing to hire a bridge operator.22 Kamin and Rachlinski concluded that “outcome knowledge deeply affected participants’ interpretations of a complex
story.”23 Moreover, attempts to ameliorate hindsight bias by use of mock jury
instructions were unsuccessful.24

16. See Mark Kelman et al., Decomposing Hindsight Bias, 16 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 251, 252
(1998) (distinguishing among primary, secondary, and tertiary hindsight bias).
17. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 138.
18. See, e.g., Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight Bias,
20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501, 511 (1996) (reporting that hindsight bias affected mock jurors’ “ratings
of the foreseeability of violence” and their “opinions of how well therapists fulfilled their duty”); see
also Rachlinski, supra note 14, at 576-81 (listing studies). For a critical view, see Jay J.J. ChristensenSzalanski & Cynthia Fobian Willham, The Hindsight Bias: A Meta-Analysis, 48 ORG’L BEHAV. & HUM.
DECISION PROCESSES 147, 162 (1991) (“The results of this meta-analysis revealed that the overall
effect size . . . of the hindsight bias is not large.”); Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?, supra
note 5, at 1963 (“[H]indsight bias is not necessarily the juggernaut that Professor Rachlinski and other
legal decision theorists portray it to be.”).
19. 338 F.2d 708 (2d Cir. 1964).
20. Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post • Ex Ante: Determining Liability in Hindsight, 19
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89 (1995).
21. Id. at 93-94. Of those subjects in the hindsight condition, some also received jury instructions that
sought to reduce the effect of hindsight bias. Id.
22. Id. at 98.
23. Id. at 99.
24. See id. at 98. Indeed, according to Jeff Rachlinski, “the psychological research demonstrates that
the hindsight bias is an extremely robust phenomenon,” and attempts to ameliorate the bias through various “debiasing” techniques have proven only partially successful at best. See Rachlinski, supra note 14, at
586-88. But see Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature Conclusions,
31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1299-1313 (1999) (arguing that “use of several [debiasing strategies] has the potential to reduce the [hindsight] bias enough to raise serious questions about the wisdom of adopting reforms
that could significantly favor defendants”); Merrie Jo Stallard & Debra L. Worthington, Reducing the
Hindsight Bias Utilizing Attorney Closing Arguments, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 671, 682 (1998) (“[T]he
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The significance of hindsight bias for legal decisionmaking is obvious: In any
number of contexts, juries and other legal decisionmakers are required to
evaluate conduct in retrospect and estimate the likelihood that an uncertain
event would occur. Examples include determinations of whether a party was
negligent, whether conduct was reasonable, and whether a contractual contingency was foreseeable.25
2. Anchoring
In estimating a numerical amount, people tend to start with some initial
value—an “anchor”—and then come up with a final estimate by making
adjustments to the anchor. If the anchor provides useful information about the
underlying value (such as the list price), and if people make reasonable adjustments, this “anchor and adjustment” heuristic can be a useful decisionmaking
approach. But anchoring can be problematic if people start with an irrelevant
anchor or fail to make adequate adjustments to the initial value.26 For example,
in one study, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman asked subjects to estimate
various percentages, such as the percentage of countries in the United Nations
that are African. The starting point for the estimates was a number from one to
100 spun on a “wheel of fortune”—an obviously irrelevant number. The subjects were then asked to state whether the correct number was higher or lower
and by how much. The median estimate by subjects given ten as the starting
number was that 25% of the countries in the United Nations were African; the
median estimate by subjects given sixty-five as the starting number was 45%.27
A number of studies have found that the amount of damages claimed by the
plaintiff serves as an anchor for verdicts rendered by mock juries.28 Gretchen B.
use of a debiasing strategy [in defense attorneys’ arguments] significantly reduced the number of subjects
who believed the defendants were negligent.”).
25. Rachlinski, supra note 14, at 593 (“Good faith assessments of what constitutes a reasonable course
of action in foresight can easily be judged unreasonable in hindsight. Although the hindsight bias also
might affect judgments of subjective knowledge or foreseeability, these theories lack empirical support. . . .
[I]t seems likely that the bias does affect these two types of judgments, however.”).
26. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 787-90; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1100-02; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 141; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 762
(2003) (“The most sensible conclusion is that whenever people are uncertain about appropriate values,
anchors have a significant effect, and sometimes a startlingly large one.”).
27. Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 1128.
28. Reid Hastie et al., Juror Judgments in Civil Cases: Effects of Plaintiff’s Requests and Plaintiff’s
Identity on Punitive Damage Awards, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 445, 463 (1999) (“We observed a large
effect of the plaintiff’s award request. . . . [T]he more the plaintiffs requested, the more they got. The difference in median awards between the Low Anchor ($15-50 million) and High Anchor ($50-150 million)
conditions was $35 million for an identical fact situation. The judge’s instructions that these arguments by
the attorneys were not evidence did not eliminate this dramatic effect.”); John Malouff & Nicola S.
Schutte, Shaping Juror Attitudes: Effects of Requesting Different Damage Amounts in Personal Injury
Trials, 129 J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 491, 495 (1989) (“The primary finding of the present experiment was that
when more money was requested by the plaintiff’s attorney, the jurors awarded more.”); Allan Raitz et al.,
Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert Testimony on Jurors’ Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 385, 393 (1990) (“There is also evidence that jurors in the no expert condition may have
‘anchored’ on a figure presented at trial.”); W. Kip Viscusi, The Challenge of Punitive Damages Mathematics, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 313, 329 (2001) (finding that “[r]espondents, in effect, abandon the constraints
imposed by the deterrence value table and base their judgments [of the appropriate punitive damages
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Chapman and Brian H. Bornstein studied the effect of plaintiff demands on
mock jury verdicts and found that (1) “the amount requested . . . serves as an
anchor that affects compensation awards,” and (2) “this effect is linear, even
with the extreme amounts used in [the] study,” which ranged from $100 to $1
billion.29 The title of their study summarizes their findings: The More You Ask
For, the More You Get.30 To the extent irrelevant numbers involved in the litigation process alter the damages awarded by juries (and judges and arbitrators
as well), awards may be higher or lower than is appropriate.
3. The Representativeness Heuristic
People tend to predict the likelihood that an event or person falls within a
certain category based on whether the characteristics of the event or person
seem representative of the category. This “representativeness heuristic” can be
useful, but it can also lead to mistakes when people rely too heavily on the
characteristic and too little on the rate at which a characteristic occurs in the
underlying population (the “base rate”).31 In one study, for example, Tversky
and Kahneman described to subjects a woman who had been a philosophy
major in college and “was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination and
social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations.”32 When
asked whether it was more likely the woman was a bank teller or a bank teller
involved in the feminist movement, almost 90% of the subjects chose the latter.
But logically, the class of bank tellers includes the class of feminist bank tellers,
such that necessarily the woman is more likely to be a bank teller than a feminist bank teller. The subjects failed to consider the base rate, instead putting
too much weight on characteristics that appeared representative of the smaller
class.33
amount] largely on the anchoring influence” of the amount requested by the plaintiff). As another example, studies have found that statutory damages caps served as anchors for awards of compensatory and
punitive damages. See Verlin B. Hinsz & Kristin E. Indahl, Assimilation to Anchors for Damage Awards
in a Mock Civil Trial, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 991, 1016 (1995) (finding that damage awards tend
toward damages limits); Jennifer K. Robbennolt & Christina A. Studebaker, Anchoring in the Courtroom:
The Effects of Caps on Punitive Damages, 23 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 353, 361, 366 (1999) (finding that high
caps resulted in higher damages).
29. Gretchen B. Chapman & Brian H. Bornstein, The More You Ask For, the More You Get:
Anchoring in Personal Injury Verdicts, 10 APPLIED COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 519, 526-27 (1996).
30. Id.
31. See, e.g., Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 805-08; Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1085-87.
32. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgments of and by Representativeness, in JUDGMENT
UNDER UNCERTAINTY, supra note 5, at 84, 92-93. For a discussion of criticisms of the “Linda problem”
(so called because of the name given to the woman by Tversky and Kahneman), see Keith E. Stanovich &
Richard F. West, Individual Differences in Reasoning: Implications for the Rationality Debate?, in
HEURISTICS AND BIASES, supra note 5, at 421, 433-34. For a skeptical view, see Gerd Gigerenzer, How to
Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases,” 2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 83, 90101 (1991).
33. A related heuristic is availability, in which people tend to disregard base rates and place too much
weight on memorable events. E.g., Tversky & Kahneman, supra note 5, at 1127-28. Jolls et al. cite “anecdote-driven environmental legislation” as an example, explaining that the availability heuristic “encourages the well-known ‘pollutant of the month’ syndrome, in which regulation is driven by recent and
memorable instances of harm.” Jolls et al., supra note 5, at 1518. Some supporters of increased regulation
of consumer and employment arbitration have sought to take advantage of this heuristic, citing anecdotal
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In the context of legal decisionmaking, commentators have relied on the
representativeness heuristic to justify rules of evidence, such as the inadmissibility of character evidence.34 The fear is that jurors will disregard the relevant
base rate and instead place too much weight on the evidence of bad character.35
4. Extremeness Aversion
Individuals may seek to avoid extreme results. Experimental studies have
found that adding an extreme third option alters the choices subjects make
between two other options, even if the third option provides no relevant information about the other two choices.36 For example, in a study by Itamar Simonson and Tversky, subjects who had been asked to choose between two cameras,
one costing $169.99 and one costing $239.99, were evenly split between the two.
A third option was then added: a camera costing $469.99. With the camera
costing $239.99 now the intermediate option, the percentage of subjects choosing it increased, even though there was an additional choice available.37
According to Cass Sunstein, such “[e]xtremeness aversion gives rise to compromise effects. As between given alternatives, most people seek a compromise.”38 The implications of extremeness aversion for the legal system are
straightforward: to the extent legal decisionmakers have an aversion to extreme
outcomes, “[o]ther things being equal, juries and judges may well try to choose
a compromise solution.”39
B. Application to Real-World Jurors
As this discussion illustrates, behavioral studies of legal decisionmaking
raise serious questions about the accuracy of decisionmaking by jurors. Indeed,
these studies have prompted some commentators to suggest the possibility of
reducing the role of juries in the civil justice system.40 An important caveat,
however, is that the extent to which the results of experimental studies using

instances of allegedly abusive arbitration practices as evidence of the need for new legislation. E.g.,
Senator Russell D. Feingold, Mandatory Arbitration: What Process is Due?, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS., 281,
281 (2002).
34. FED. R. EVID. 404(a).
35. Korobkin & Ulen, supra note 5, at 1087-88.
36. E.g., Schlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, How Much Is Investor Autonomy Worth?, 57 J. FIN.
1593, 1610 (2002) (“Consistent with extremeness aversion, [a given investment program] is the least attractive when framed as an extreme choice and most attractive when framed as the middle choice.”); Mark
Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 287, 290-95 (1996)
(reporting that subjects were more likely to choose a verdict of murder over manslaughter when murder
was intermediate option).
37. Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MARKETING RES. 281, 290 (1992).
38. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 135. Extremeness aversion is a form of context dependence, because
the preferences of the subjects vary depending on the context in which the choice is made. Kelman et al.,
supra note 36, at 288.
39. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 136.
40. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably Incoherent Judgments, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1153, 1182-84
(2002); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 26, 60 (1999).
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mock jurors apply to real-world decisionmaking by jurors cannot be known for
certain.
To be sure, some criticisms of experimental studies are not particularly
applicable to juries. For example, one reason to doubt the effectiveness of
experimental results in predicting real-world outcomes is the effect of selection.
As Richard Posner explains:
Selection effects suggest that the experimental and real-world environments will differ
systematically. The experimental subjects are chosen more or less randomly; but
people are not randomly sorted to jobs and other activities. People who cannot
calculate probabilities will either avoid gambling, if they know their cognitive weakness, or, if they do not, will soon be wiped out and thus be forced to discontinue
gambling. People who are unusually “fair” will avoid (or, again, be forced out of)
roughhouse activities—including highly competitive businesses, trial lawyering, and
the academic rat race. Hyperbolic discounters will avoid the financial services industry. These selection effects will not work perfectly, but they are likely to drive a big
41
wedge between experimental and real-world consequences of irrationality.

In contrast, the largely random selection of juries bears substantial similarities
to the selection of subjects for experimental studies—indeed, some studies have
used as subjects individuals waiting to serve as prospective jurors.42 This suggests that the results of experimental studies may be more appropriately applied
to jury decisionmaking than many other real-world activities.
On the other hand, it is no doubt true that the vast majority of jurors take
their responsibilities more seriously than do participants in experimental studies. As Philip Peters explains:
Unlike research subjects, jurors are accountable for their decisions. Each juror’s
vote will be scrutinized not only by the other jurors, but also by the judge and often by
the juror’s family and friends. Jurors also feel accountable to their communities. This
accountability distinguishes jury trials from research studies and has the potential to
43
improve jury decision-making.

Moreover, most experimental subjects receive far less information about the
case they are asked to decide than real-world jurors, raising questions about the
“ecological validity” of the experiments.44 Certainly other differences between
experimental settings and real-world jury trials likewise have the potential to
increase or decrease the effect of cognitive biases on the decisionmaking of
jurors. As a result, any conclusions from experimental studies in this area will
necessarily have some degree of uncertainty.
41. Richard A. Posner, Rational Choice, Behavioral Economics, and the Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1551,
1570-71 (1998).
42. E.g., Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey J. Rice, Assessments of Noneconomic Damage Awards in Medical
Negligence: A Comparison of Jurors with Legal Professionals, 78 IOWA L. REV. 883, 891 (1993).
43. Peters, supra note 24, at 1300-01. On the importance of accountability (or lack thereof) in
experimental studies, see Mitchell, Equal Incompetence, supra note 5, at 110-14; Philip E. Tetlock,
Accountability and Complexity of Thought, 45 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 74, 74-75 (1983) (“The
evidence on the effects of accountability is thus mixed: sometimes accountability leads to complex or
effortful information processing, and sometimes it leads to expedient decisions that can be readily justified
to others.”).
44. See Richard Lempert, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damage Awards: Failures of a Social Science
Case for Change, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 867, 877 (1999); Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?,
supra note 5, at 1985.

DRAHOZAL_FINAL.FMT.DOC

114

10/14/2004 10:18 AM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 67:105

III
HEURISTICS AND COGNITIVE BIASES
IN ARBITRAL DECISIONMAKING
The effects of cognitive illusions on jury decisionmaking have been studied
often, at least in experimental settings. The effects of cognitive biases on other
legal decisionmakers, especially arbitrators, have been studied far less. This
Part discusses the available evidence on how heuristics and cognitive biases
might affect arbitrators. It begins by examining the extremely limited empirical
research on cognitive illusions in arbitral decisionmaking. Because that evidence (experimental or otherwise) is so limited, this Part then considers evidence on the effect of cognitive illusions on judicial decisionmaking. The
assumption inherent in this comparison is that the effect of cognitive illusions
on arbitrators is more like their effect on judges than their effect on jurors. If
so, evidence on heuristics and cognitive biases from studies of judicial decisionmaking may provide some insights into arbitral decisionmaking as well.
The existing evidence on judges takes two forms: experimental studies of
judicial decisionmaking and studies of litigation outcomes comparing the results
of cases decided by judges and those decided by juries. Taken together, these
studies suggest that (1) judges are less affected by some cognitive illusions than
jurors and equally, but no more, affected by others, and (2) these differences
seem to persist in actual cases, although to a lesser degree than might be
expected from the experimental studies alone. While far from conclusive, this
evidence suggests that arbitrators may be somewhat less subject to cognitive
illusions than jurors.
A. Empirical Studies of Arbitral Decisionmaking
Empirical studies of the prevalence of cognitive illusions in arbitral decisionmaking are exceedingly rare. I am aware of no such studies using experimental techniques. Moreover, arbitration proceedings are private, and most
arbitration awards are unpublished.45 As a result, studies of outcomes in commercial (including consumer and employment) arbitration are uncommon.46
45. Cf. Christopher R. Drahozal, Commercial Norms, Commercial Codes, and International Commercial Arbitration, 33 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 79, 122 (2000) (discussing international arbitration awards).
46. In addition to the studies discussed in this section, see the studies of employment arbitration outcomes by Lisa B. Bingham. Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1
EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189 (1997) [hereinafter Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect]; Lisa B.
Bingham, On Repeat Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment Arbitration Claims, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998) [hereinafter Bingham, On Repeat Players];
Lisa B. Bingham, Self-Determination in Dispute System Design and Employment Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 873 (2002) [hereinafter Bingham, Self-Determination]; Lisa B. Bingham, Unequal Bargaining
Power: An Alternative Account for the Repeat Player Effect in Employment Arbitration, in INDUSTRIAL
RELATIONS RESEARCH ASSOCIATION 50TH ANNUAL PROCEEDINGS 33 (1999) [hereinafter Bingham,
Unequal Bargaining Power]; Lisa B. Bingham & Simon Sarraf, Employment Arbitration Before and After
the Due Process Protocol for Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory Disputes Arising Out of Employment:
Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes a Difference, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 53RD ANNUAL
CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Samuel Estreicher ed., 2003).
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One area in which some empirical work has been done is in testing whether
arbitrators have a tendency to reach compromise awards—to “split the baby.”
This phenomenon, if it exists, is sometimes credited to the anchoring of awards
on the amount sought by the claimant.47 Compromise awards would also be
consistent with extremeness aversion by arbitrators. Another suggested explanation is that market forces give arbitrators an incentive to compromise, to
keep both sides happy and willing to select the arbitrator again.48 The implications of arbitral incentives are less clear in the context of consumer and
employment arbitration (although behavioral considerations would seem to be
the same). Individual consumers and employees are unlikely to be repeat players, so arbitrators have little incentive to reach compromise solutions to induce
consumers and employees to select them again. Attorneys for consumers and
employees, however, may be repeat players.49
Two published studies of commercial arbitration (one domestic and one
international) have found no evidence that arbitrators make compromise
awards. In her classic study, Soia Mentschikoff examined commercial arbitrations administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) between
1947 and 1950.50 In 50% of the awards, the claimant was awarded either all or
none of the amount sought. “Obviously,” Mentschikoff concluded, “such
awards can not be the result of compromise.”51 In addition, Mentschikoff
examined more closely thirty-six additional cases, finding that “many of the partial awards are arrived at in a judicial manner since they result from the striking
of particular items of damage that the arbitrators believe are not justified under
the facts or law of the particular case.”52
A recent study of international arbitration awards by Stephanie E. Keer and
Richard W. Naimark also rejected the view that arbitrators make compromise
awards.53 In a sample of fifty-four international arbitration proceedings administered by the AAA, the mean award as a percentage of the amount claimed
was 50.53%, and the median award was 46.66%. The distribution of the
awards, however, was bimodal, with 31% of claimants recovering nothing and
35% recovering 100% of the amount claimed. The remaining 34% of claimants

47. Stephanie E. Keer & Richard W. Naimark, Arbitrators Do Not “Split the Baby”—Empirical Evidence from International Business Arbitration, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 573, 573-74 (2001).
48. Cf. Alan Scott Rau, Integrity in Private Judging, 38 S. TEX. L. REV. 485, 523 (1997) (“The dynamic
of arbitrator self-interest has long been familiar in collective bargaining cases and is thought, for example,
to provide one explanation for the apparently common practice of compromise awards. Repeat business
for the arbitrator is likely only if he is able to retain the future goodwill of both union and management;
the desire to do so may give him an incentive (in the hallowed phrase) to ‘split the baby.’”).
49. See Drahozal, supra note 8, at 751; Samuel Estreicher, Predispute Agreements to Arbitrate Statutory Claims, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1344, 1355 (1997). But see Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note
46, at 198-99 (“[T]here is reason to believe that most individual members of the plaintiffs’ bar may never
successfully emerge as repeat players in employment arbitration.”).
50. Soia Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846, 856-67 (1961).
51. Id. at 861.
52. Id.
53. Keer & Naimark, supra note 47.
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were awarded a widely distributed percentage of the amount claimed.54 Keer
and Naimark concluded that “the results from this study show emphatically that
arbitrators do not engage in the practice of ‘splitting the baby.’”55 The studies
examining the possibility of compromise awards thus have uncovered no evidence of extremeness aversion in arbitral decisionmaking.56
Several studies have sought to compare outcomes in arbitration and litigation, but they shed little light on behavioral aspects of arbitral decisionmaking.
In one study, Theodore Eisenberg and Elizabeth Hill compared a sample of 261
AAA employment arbitration awards with verdicts in state-court employment
cases and employment discrimination cases in federal court.57 Relying on the
AAA’s categorization of the arbitration agreements as either “promulgated” by
the company or individually negotiated by the employee, they found that winrates and awards in arbitrations arising under individually negotiated agreements were largely indistinguishable from the outcomes in court cases. They
acknowledged, however, that they were unable to control either for “original
differences in the merits of the disputes routed to arbitration and litigation” or
for differences in settlements, which could undercut the comparability of disputes in arbitration and litigation.58
In another study, William Howard compared a sample of arbitration awards
dealing with employment discrimination claims to court cases involving alleged
employment discrimination.59 The mean jury award in the court cases studied
was $417,178, while the mean arbitration award was $114,905. Howard did not
attempt to control for differences in the claims, such as the strength of the claim
on the merits and the extent of injuries suffered. Thus, at least some of the difference in recovery between court and arbitration likely is due to differences in
54. Id. at 574. Keer and Naimark also describe an unpublished AAA study of 4,479 commercial arbitration awards with results consistent with their findings. Id. at 574 (finding that “approximately 42% of
those cases were awarded 0-20% of their original claim amount,” while “30% were awarded 81-100% of
their original claim amount”).
55. Id. at 578. Neither study makes any attempt to compare the likelihood of compromise awards in
arbitration to the likelihood of compromise judgments or verdicts in civil litigation.
56. An alternative interpretation of these results might be that extremeness aversion applies only to
choices among discrete alternatives but not to choices along a continuum, as an arbitrator (or jury) would
make in determining the amount of damages to award.
57. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical
Comparison, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA, supra note 46. For
more detailed information on the AAA arbitration awards in the sample, see Elizabeth Hill, Due Process
at Low Cost: An Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration Under the Auspices of the American Arbitration Association, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 777 (2003) [hereinafter Hill, Due Process at Low Cost];
Elizabeth Hill, AAA Employment Arbitration: A Fair Forum at Low Cost, DISP. RESOL. J., May-July 2003,
at 9.
58. Eisenberg & Hill, supra note 57, at 21-23. Michael Delikat and Morris Kleiner found little difference in outcomes between employment arbitrations involving securities industry employees and employment discrimination cases litigated in federal court. Michael Delikat & Morris Kleiner, Empirical Study of
Securities Industry Arbitration v. Litigation, in ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE
EMPLOYMENT ARENA, supra note 46. They acknowledge, however, that they lacked data on “additional
variables that may control for factors that may influence the outcomes of a trial or private sector adjudication.” Id. at 7.
59. William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination: What Really Does
Happen? What Really Should Happen?, DISP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40.
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the claims in the different fora, rather than differences between decisionmakers.60
Lewis Maltby compared the results of AAA employment arbitrations from
1993 to 1995 with the results of employment cases litigated in federal courts in
1994.61 He recognized that the cases were not comparable on the merits, noting
that “[t]he district court cases all involved statutory civil rights claims for which
the law provides emotional distress and punitive damages” while “[m]any of the
AAA cases . . . were contract claims with only economic damages.”62 Maltby
sought to control for the differing types of claims by comparing arbitration and
litigation on the basis of damages awarded as a percentage of the amount
claimed. Under this approach, he found that employees recovered 18% of
amounts claimed in arbitration, but only 10.4% of amounts claimed in court.63
Donald Wittman has compared outcomes in jury cases with outcomes in
court-annexed arbitration proceedings.64 Examining a sample of 353 cases tried
both by an arbitrator and a jury (thus ensuring that the facts of the cases were
the same), he found substantial similarities between jury decisionmaking and
arbitral decisionmaking.65 Unfortunately, the results provide little insight into
how arbitration awards in consumer and employment cases (in other words,
arbitrations that are not court-annexed) compare to jury verdicts. In Wittman’s
study, arbitrators had a strong incentive to make an award close to the likely
jury verdict in the case, and parties had a strong incentive to select arbitrators
whose awards were accurate predictions of jury verdicts.66 Parties to predispute
arbitration clauses in consumer contracts have no comparable incentive to
prefer arbitrators whose awards mirror jury verdicts.
Finally, Neil Vidmar and Jeffrey J. Rice conducted an experimental study
that compared the damages awarded by jurors and arbitrators in a hypothetical
medical malpractice case.67 They gave a description of the case to twenty-one

60. Id. at 45. For further criticisms of Howard’s methodology, see Hill, Due Process at Low Cost,
supra note 57, at 788-89.
61. Lewis Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, in ARBITRATION NOW 1,
16-18 (Paul H. Haagen ed., 1999) [hereinafter Maltby, Private Justice]; see Lewis Maltby, Employment
Arbitration: Is It Really Second Class Justice?, DISP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 23 [hereinafter Maltby,
Second Class Justice]. Maltby used data on employment arbitration awards collected and reported by Lisa
Bingham, see infra text accompanying notes 133-34.
62. Maltby, Private Justice, supra note 61, at 17-18.
63. Id. at 18. For an alternative interpretation of Maltby’s results, see infra note 143.
64. Donald Wittman, Lay Juries, Professional Arbitrators, and the Arbitrator Selection Hypothesis, 5
AM. L. & ECON. REV. 61 (2003). Robert MacCoun describes another, unpublished study by Wittman that
“compared jury and arbitration awards and found that juries were more variable than arbitrators,”
possibly due to “forum selection processes.” MacCoun, supra note 4, at 164-65.
65. Wittman, supra note 64, at 80 (“[W]ith the exception of the deep pockets issue, the jury and
arbitrator equations are very similar regarding both their coefficients and their sum of squared errors.”).
66. Wittman examined court-annexed arbitration conducted under a scheme whereby a party
requesting a trial had to pay the arbitrator’s fee and other costs if the jury verdict was not more favorable
to the party than the arbitration award. Id.
67. Vidmar & Rice, supra note 42; see NEIL VIDMAR, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND THE
AMERICAN JURY: CONFRONTING THE MYTHS ABOUT JURY INCOMPETENCE, DEEP POCKETS AND
OUTRAGEOUS DAMAGE AWARDS 221-35 (1995).
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lawyers who had served as arbitrators “for various personal injury, contract, and
labor disputes,” and eighty-nine prospective jurors who actually had been
selected for jury duty.68 The median and mean damage awards by the two
groups were statistically indistinguishable.69 The damage awards by the individual jurors, however, had a substantially higher variance (although when the
individual awards were pooled into twelve-juror panels, the variance fell substantially).70
Overall, the extremely limited empirical evidence on cognitive illusions in
arbitral decisionmaking casts little light on how arbitral decisionmaking compares to jury decisionmaking. Arbitrators (at least in commercial cases) do not
seem to be subject to extremeness aversion, and there is some experimental
evidence that arbitral awards may have a similar mean but less variance than
the verdicts of individual jurors. Studies comparing outcomes in litigation and
arbitration, while increasingly common, do not focus specifically on cognitive
illusions and are subject to serious limitations due to case-selection effects. At
present, there is far too little evidence to draw firm conclusions.
B. Empirical Studies Comparing Decisionmaking by Judges and Juries
Notwithstanding the limited empirical evidence on heuristics and cognitive
biases in arbitral decisionmaking, it may be possible to gain some insight into
arbitral decisionmaking by examining judicial decisionmaking, a close but by no
means exact analogy. Arbitrators, like judges, resolve disputes on a recurring
basis.71 Jurors’ experiences, by contrast, are limited to individual trials. Arbitrators, like judges, receive specialized training; jurors receive only a judge’s
instructions. Many arbitrators, like judges, are lawyers.72 The vast majority of
jurors are not. Demographically, too, arbitrators tend to look more like judges
than jurors.73 The analogy is, of course, only a rough one. Nevertheless, given
68. Vidmar & Rice, supra note 42, at 890-91.
69. Id. at 893.
70. Id. at 897-98; see also infra Part IV.A. (discussing potential differences between group and individual decisionmaking).
71. See Mitchell, Equal Incompetence, supra note 5, at 153-54 (discussing the potential importance of
“feedback and opportunities for learning” in reducing the effect of cognitive illusions).
72. Although lawyers and other professionals are subject to the effects of cognitive biases, some
research suggests that they may be less affected than nonprofessionals. See Chris Guthrie, Panacea or
Pandora’s Box? The Costs of Options in Negotiation, 88 IOWA L. REV. 601, 641 (2003) (“This is not to
say, of course, that lawyers are pure ‘rational actors’ who are impervious to the effects of ‘psychological
biases’ in decisionmaking; in fact, lawyers, like other novice and expert decision-makers, are susceptible to
such biases. However, experimental evidence suggests that lawyers are more likely than others to be able
to resist these biases and make decisions rationally.”). Not all arbitrators are lawyers either. Many arbitrators in trade association arbitrations, for example, are selected for their experience in the industry. See,
e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules,
Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724, 1728 (2001). But such experience itself could provide
feedback and an opportunity to learn that might improve arbitral decisionmaking relative to juries. See
supra note 71.
73. Compare U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: HOW
REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES FARE IN DISCRIMINATION DISPUTES 2 (1994), with Amy E. Black &
Stanley Rothman, Shall We Kill All the Lawyers First?: Insider and Outsider Views of the Legal Profession,
21 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 838-42 (1998).
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the lack of studies of how biases and heuristics affect arbitrators, studies comparing their effects on judges and juries may provide some insight.74
1. Experimental Studies
Only recently have researchers begun conducting experimental studies of
cognitive illusions in judicial decisionmaking. Although only a handful of such
studies have been published, they have been broader in scope than the studies
of arbitral decisionmaking.75 To date, the results are somewhat conflicting.
Nevertheless, as a general matter, the studies have found judicial decisionmaking to be less affected by cognitive illusions than decisionmaking by juries in
some respects, but equally affected in others.76
In one study, Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, and Andrew J. Wistrich
administered a questionnaire to federal magistrate judges attending a Federal
Judicial Center workshop in 1999.77 A total of 168 judges returned the questionnaire, with one requesting that the response not be used in further research,
leaving a sample of 167. The questionnaire contained a series of hypothetical
fact patterns designed to test for the effect of various heuristics and cognitive
biases on judicial decisionmaking. Based on the answers to the questionnaire,
the authors concluded that judges were less affected by some cognitive illusions
than jurors but similarly affected by others. The judges “were impressive” in
answering correctly “a difficult [evidentiary] question in a short period of time,”

74. The focus here is on studies that compare decisionmaking by judges and juries, rather than studies
that consider one of the two (usually juries) alone. For surveys of empirical research on jury decisionmaking, see Robert J. MacCoun, Experimental Research on Jury Decisionmaking, 244 SCIENCE 1046,
1046-50 (1989); MacCoun, supra note 4, at 137; Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury:
An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 849 (1998). For a survey of empirical studies focusing on
punitive damage awards, see Jennifer Robbennolt, Determining Punitive Damages: Empirical Insights and
Implications for Reform, 50 BUFF. L. REV. 103 (2002).
75. In addition, experimental studies have compared hypothetical damage awards of judges and
jurors, without explicitly considering cognitive illusions. See, e.g., Stephen Landsman & Richard F. Rakos,
A Preliminary Inquiry into the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Juries in Civil Litigation, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113, 125 (1994) (“[J]udges and jurors in civil cases react similarly when
exposed to material that is subsequently ruled inadmissible—their perceptions of central trial issues are
altered.”); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Punitive Damages Decision Making: The Decisions of Citizens and
Trial Court Judges, 26 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 315, 333 (2002) (“No differences were found in the likelihood that punitive damages would be awarded or in the sizes of the punitive damages awards of judges
and jury-eligible citizens.”); Roselle L. Wissler et al., Decisionmaking about General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 756 (1999) (“[T]he models evidence a
remarkable degree of similarity among all groups of decisionmakers, plus a high degree of predictability,
in regard to their judgments of injury severity. As to the translation of injury perceptions into monetary
awards, however, more differences among the groups appeared, and the predictive power of the models
declined.”).
76. See Rachlinski, supra note 13, at 1200 (“Although few studies have been conducted on judges,
what work has been done suggests that judges are also subject to the same cognitive errors in judgment
that affect juries.”).
77. Guthrie et al., supra note 6. For a study on hindsight bias using a sample of fifty-eight auditors
and sixty-five state and federal trial judges, see John C. Anderson et al., Evaluation of Auditor Decisions:
Hindsight Bias Effects and the Expectation Gap, 14 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 711, 730 (1993) (“[O]ur findings
provide new evidence that individuals’ evaluations of auditor’s performance are dependent on outcome
information. Subjects provided higher auditor evaluations in the presence of favorable outcome information and lower evaluations in the presence of unfavorable outcome information.”).
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thereby avoiding the representativeness heuristic (although 60% still answered
incorrectly).78 However, the results suggested that judges were as susceptible to
anchoring effects and hindsight bias as other decisionmakers.79 Thus, judges
awarded substantially less when the defendant moved to dismiss for failure to
satisfy the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for federal diversity
jurisdiction (which plainly was met on the facts) than when no such motion was
filed. In the view of Guthrie et al., “the $75,000 jurisdictional minimum
anchored their damage awards.”80 Further, judges’ predictions of the likely outcome of a case on appeal were highly sensitive to what they were told about the
actual outcome, which, according to Guthrie et al., was an illustration of hindsight bias.81
A study by W. Kip Viscusi and Reid Hastie found judges to be less subject
to hindsight bias than mock jurors.82 The authors distributed a questionnaire to
a sample of state-court judges (both trial and appellate) attending a law-andeconomics program. They received ninety-five responses, a response rate of
almost 100%. They then administered the same questionnaire to mock jurors,
to facilitate comparison. In a pair of tests for hindsight bias, Viscusi and Hastie
found that the judges “were much less prone to hindsight bias than are jurors in
their treatment of corporate safety decisions. Indeed, in making legal judgments, there was little effect of hindsight for judges, as compared to substantial
effects for mock jurors.”83
Several commentators have criticized the sample of judges studied by
Viscusi and Hastie. Guthrie et al. assert that the sample and the context “may
have induced somewhat more calculated reasoning processes that dampened
the effect.”84 Richard Lempert likewise criticizes the sample of judges, asserting
that the program “may well have attracted judges who are more pro-business

78. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 809-11.
79. Id. at 787-94, 799-805. Unlike the Viscusi and the Hastie and Viscusi studies, see infra text accompanying notes 82-83, Guthrie et al. did not administer a similar questionnaire to mock jurors. Indeed, at
least some of the questions they asked required decisions that a jury would not make. See, e.g., id. at 791
(describing an anchoring question requiring magistrate judges to rule on a motion to dismiss for want of
subject matter jurisdiction). Instead, Guthrie et al. compared the magnitude of the biases they found to
the magnitude found in other studies, based on different fact patterns, id. at 816-18, making it difficult to
draw any firm conclusions about comparability. See Mitchell, Taking Behavioralism Too Seriously?, supra
note 5, at 1998 n.184.
80. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 791-92.
81. Id. at 802-03.
82. Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, What Juries Can’t Do Well: The Jury’s Performance as a Risk
Manager, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 901 (1998); Viscusi, supra note 40. The results of the study were published
separately by Viscusi and by Viscusi and Hastie together.
83. Viscusi, supra note 40, at 59; Hastie & Viscusi, supra note 82, at 917. Viscusi and Hastie also
examined risk assessment by judges, concluding that while “judges did exhibit many of the patterns of
biases in risk judgments that have been the focus of the literature on the rationality of choice under uncertainty,” in general, “these biases do not contaminate the thinking of judges with respect to their
interpretation of legal rules.” Viscusi, supra note 40, at 60; see also W. Kip Viscusi, Jurors, Judges, and the
Mistreatment of Risk by the Courts, 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 107, 135 (2001) (finding that “[j]udges had more
accurate risk beliefs and were less prone to overestimate low-probability events” than were jurors).
84. Guthrie et al., supra note 6, at 818 n.201; see also Robbennolt, supra note 75, at 335.
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than judges generally.”85 Lempert is also critical that the sample included both
trial judges and appellate judges because “[t]rial judges, as a group, may have
different values or, because their experiences differ, they may respond differently in hindsight.”86 While perhaps underestimating the susceptibility of judges
generally to hindsight bias, at a minimum, the study suggests that some judges
are able to avoid this bias. As such, it also suggests that some arbitrators may
be able to avoid hindsight bias as well.
2. Studies of Litigation Outcomes
While experimental studies are able to control for the underlying facts of the
dispute, studies of real-world litigation outcomes avoid charges of lack of realism.87 This section examines several studies that compare outcomes (either win
rates or damage awards) in cases decided by judges and juries, to see the extent
to which experimental differences in judicial versus jury decisionmaking may
affect real cases.
The earliest and best-known study seeking to compare outcomes between
judges and juries is Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel’s University of Chicago Jury
Project.88 Kalven and Zeisel collected reports on 4000 civil jury verdicts and
then asked each judge “how he would have decided the case had it been tried to
him alone.”89 They found that in 78% of the cases, the judge agreed with the
jury’s verdict on liability. In 12%, the jury found for the plaintiff while the
judge would have found for the defendant. In the remaining 10%, the jury
found for the defendant while the judge would have found for the plaintiff.90
Juries, however, awarded significantly higher damages. Of the cases in which
the judge agreed with the jury’s finding for the plaintiff (44%), on average the
jury-awarded damages were 20% higher than what the judge would have
awarded.91 One weakness with the methodology is that the judges were asked
whether they agreed with the jury’s verdict after it was rendered, rather than
being asked before the verdict what they thought the outcome should be. Thus,
“it is possible that their responses partially reflected their attitudes toward the
jury system in addition to their evaluation of the cases at hand.”92 The study has

85. Lempert, supra note 44, at 884. For a response, see Reid Hastie & W. Kip Viscusi, Juries, Hindsight, and Punitive Damages Awards: Reply to Richard Lempert, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 987 (2002).
86. Lempert, supra note 44, at 884.
87. See supra Part II.B. Such studies also necessarily control for differences in the structural characteristics of the various dispute-resolution processes, which experimental studies can do only imperfectly at
best. See infra Part IV.
88. See HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 63-64 (1966). The focus of
THE AMERICAN JURY, however, is on juries in criminal cases. Id. at 55-81.
89. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Dignity of the Civil Jury, 50 VA. L. REV. 1055, 1063 (1964).
90. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 88, at 63-64; see also Kalven, supra note 89, at 1065 (reporting
79% agreement in personal injury cases).
91. KALVEN & ZEISEL, supra note 88, at 64 n.13; Kalven, supra note 89 at 1065.
92. MacCoun, supra note 4, at 165. For other criticisms, see Michael H. Walsh, The American Jury: A
Reassessment, 79 YALE L.J. 142, 146-47 (1969) (pointing out that the “sample used was not statistically
ideal”).
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the advantage, however, of ensuring that the cases evaluated by the jury and the
judge were identical.
Other studies of litigation outcomes have been much less able to control for
case characteristics. Thus, they are potentially subject to serious selection
effects that make interpretation of the results difficult.93 For example, in a
sample of federal court cases decided between 1979 and 1989, Kevin M. Clermont and Theodore Eisenberg found a number of categories of cases in which
plaintiffs had higher win rates before judges than before juries.94 They concluded that “the most plausible explanation of the data lies in small differences
between judges’ and juries’ treatment of cases and, more importantly, in the
parties’ varying the selection of cases that reach judge and jury.”95 A subsequent study by Eric Helland and Alexander Tabarrok, using a sample of statecourt verdicts, found that “[j]uries do grant systematically larger awards to
injured plaintiffs than judges.”96 Most of the difference, they found, was due to
differential routing of cases to judges and juries:
The differences in judge and jury decision-making we have discovered, however,
explain only one-quarter to one-third of the difference in average award rates across
judges and juries. Three[-]quarters to two-thirds of the difference in average awards is
due not to differences in decision-making but to differences in the sample of cases
97
appearing before judges and juries.

Of course, the same results could be restated with the opposite emphasis: up to
one-third of the difference between awards by judges and juries persists even
after attempting to control for case-selection effects.
A recent study by Theodore Eisenberg et al. focused on the award of punitive damages by judges and jurors.98 They considered a sample of state-court
jury trials from forty-five of the seventy-five most populous counties in the
United States from 1996, and found that “[j]uries and judges award punitive
damages at about the same rate, and their punitive awards bear about the same
relation to their compensatory awards.”99 While they found somewhat greater
variance in jury awards, “the effect is not robust and leads to very few jury punitive awards outside the range of what judges are expected to award.”100 Joni
Hersch and W. Kip Viscusi, using the same data as Eisenberg et al., reached a
strikingly different conclusion:
93. See George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1 (1984); Joel Waldfogel, Selection of Cases for Trial, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 419 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
94. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Trial By Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77
CORNELL L. REV. 1124, 1137-38 (1992).
95. Id. at 1126. For an alternative interpretation of their results, see Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to the Law of Evidence, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1477, 1501 (1999).
96. Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, Runaway Judges? Selection Effects and the Jury, 16 J.L. &
ECON. ORG. 306, 330 (2000).
97. Id.
98. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Juries, Judges, and Punitive Damages: An Empirical Study, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 743 (2002).
99. Id. at 779.
100. Id.
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What we found based on a careful statistical analysis was that these data are quite consistent with there being greater restraint by judges. Our statistical analysis of the level
of punitive damages awards for all cases, including those with compensatory damages
but no punitive awards, showed that juries award higher levels of punitive damages. If
one considers the components of this effect, juries also differ from judges. Juries have
a higher probability of awarding punitive damages. Moreover, juries are especially
likely to make a large punitive damages award conditional on there being a punitive
damages award. Thus, juries are more prone to generate large awards than are
101
judges.

The differing results, according to Hersch and Viscusi, were the result of the
two studies treating trials from one county differently and Eisenberg et al.’s use
of two jury variables highly correlated with one another.102
A final study by Eisenberg (with different coauthors) focused directly on
cognitive differences between judges and juries and found more coherence in
punitive damages awards than behavioral theories would predict.103 The cognitive problem considered was one of “scaling without a modulus”: the difficulty
of translating moral judgments about behavior into a quantitative damages
award.104 The authors found (using the same state-court jury sample as above)105
some incoherence in punitive damages awards of the sort predicted by the
theory, but far less than experimental studies would indicate.106 They concluded
that “[f]orces seem to be at work that already promote coherence,” so structural
changes suggested by some commentators (such as shifting punitive damages
decisionmaking from juries to judges)107 may be unnecessary.108
C. Conclusions
The existing evidence on the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitral decisionmaking is slight. Drawing from studies of judicial decisionmaking (on the
assumption that arbitrators are more like judges than jurors), however, provides

101. JONI HERSCH & W. KIP VISCUSI, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: HOW JUDGES AND JURIES PERFORM 36
(Harvard-John M. Olin Discussion Paper No. 362, May 2002).
102. Id. at 31-34 (explaining that the differing results were due to the disparate treatment of Harris
County, Texas, and Eisenberg et al.’s use of “both a jury indicator variable as well as the interaction of
jury trial with compensatory damages,” which served “to induce multicollinearity”).
103. Theodore Eisenberg et al., Reconciling Experimental Incoherence with Real-World Coherence in
Punitive Damages, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1239 (2002).
104. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (with Notes on Cognition and Valuation in
Law), 107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998); Sunstein et al., supra note 40, at 1155; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 142-44.
According to Sunstein et al., one consequence is that while decisions may be “sensible and coherent”
within a category of cases, they become incoherent when compared across categories of cases. Sunstein et
al., supra note 40, at 1170. Decisionmakers who see multiple categories of cases (for example, judges and
perhaps arbitrators) thus may make better decisions than decisionmakers who see only one case (for
example, juries). Id.
105. See supra text accompanying notes 98-102.
106. Eisenberg et al. tested the following predictions they derived from the theory: (1) “the relation
between punitive and compensatory awards will not meaningfully vary across case categories in actual jury
cases”; and (2) “‘case categories’ influence should be greater in judge-tried cases than in jury-tried cases.”
Eisenberg et al., supra note 103, at 1248. They found “modest support” for these predictions in the data.
Id.
107. See supra text accompanying note 40.
108. Eisenberg et al., supra note 103, at 1259.
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further insights. The experimental studies of judges and jurors, while certainly
not conclusive, find that judges are less subject to some cognitive biases and
heuristics than jurors and equally, but no more, subject to others. Although
studies of litigation outcomes suggest that the effect of cognitive illusions is less
than might be expected, some differences in outcome seem to persist. As such,
the studies suggest (albeit tentatively) that arbitral decisionmaking, to the
extent it is like judicial decisionmaking, is less subject than jury decisionmaking
to some cognitive illusions, and equally subject to others.109
IV
STRUCTURAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
JURY TRIALS AND ARBITRATION
Part III suggested a tentative conclusion about the effects of cognitive biases
and heuristics on arbitral decisionmaking, based largely (although not exclusively) on experimental studies: arbitrators may be less subject to at least some
cognitive illusions than are jurors. This Part examines various structural differences between jury trials and arbitration proceedings and considers whether the
differences are likely to increase or decrease the effects of cognitive illusions.
A. Group Versus Individual Decisionmaking
A key difference between juries and arbitrators is in the decisionmaking
dynamic. Arbitrators decide either alone or in panels of three,110 whereas juries
decide in groups varying from six to twelve members.111 Most experimental
studies of jury behavior ignore the possible effects of group deliberations and
focus on the decisionmaking of individual jurors.112 Others select “synthetic
109. If arbitral decisionmaking bears at least some relationship to decisionmaking by judges, one might
ask why businesses use arbitration clauses rather than jury-trial waivers in their standard-form contracts.
There are several possible explanations. First, arbitral decisionmaking may be less subject to biases and
heuristics than judicial decisionmaking, perhaps because of market competition or the subject-matter
expertise of arbitrators. Cf. Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics and Biases in the Courts: Ignorance or Adaptation?, 79 OR. L. REV. 61, 64 (2000) (“Judges surely have some incentives to make good law and avoid
illusions of judgment, but they lack the incentives that other institutions face.”); Posner, supra note 95, at
1494 (“The literature on these illusions provides some basis for thinking that market settings tend to dispel
or at least reduce them, but none for thinking that government processes have similar effects.”). Second,
businesses might be indifferent between judges and arbitrators (or perhaps even prefer judges), but use
arbitration clauses because courts are unwilling to enforce predispute waivers of the right to jury trial. See
Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration, supra note 11, at 677-95; Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration Clauses,
Jury-Waiver Clauses, and Other Contractual Waivers of Constitutional Rights, 67 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 167, 200-04 (Winter/Spring 2004) (describing court decisions requiring knowing consent to enforce
provisions purporting to waiver a party’s jury-trial rights). Third, other factors, such as the availability of
class relief and confidentiality, may—and certainly do, to some extent—lead businesses to prefer
arbitration over bench trials.
110. E.g., AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, Rule R-15 (effective July
1, 2003) [hereinafter AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES].
111. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STATE COURT ORGANIZATION 278,
tbl. 42 (1998). For an overview of research on the effects of jury size, see SWARD, supra note 12, at 215-18.
112. See David R. Shaffer & Shannon R. Wheatman, Does Personality Influence Reactions to Judicial
Instructions? Some Preliminary Findings and Possible Implications, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 655, 657
(2000) (“[P]erhaps the greatest limitation of mock-trial simulations is that the vast majority of them
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juries” that combine individual respondents into jury panels and then use the
median response as the verdict of the synthetic jury.113 While such an approach
tends to mitigate the effect of outlying responses, it does not take into account
the dynamics of group deliberations and any effect they may have on actual
verdicts.
If group decisions differ from individual decisions, these differences in decisionmaking dynamics could be an important structural differences between jury
trials and arbitration. One possibility is that group deliberations dampen the
effect of cognitive illusions on jury verdicts because discussions within the group
improve the accuracy of the group’s decision. Because arbitrators decide alone
or in small groups, there is no, or at least less, opportunity for group deliberations to reduce the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitration awards. On the
other hand, group polarization may result in group decisions that are more
extreme than the median of the individual members’ views.114 If so, jury verdicts
may be more extreme than predicted by experimental studies, while arbitral
decisionmaking would be much less affected.
The empirical evidence on the point is mixed.115 At least some studies, however, have found that deliberations can exacerbate, rather than lessen, cognitive
biases in decisionmaking.116 For example, in an experimental study of punitive
damages awards, David Schkade and others found that jury deliberations
tended to result in more extreme verdicts: when individual jurors rated behavattempt to draw inferences from decisions rendered by nondeliberating mock jurors rather than deliberating mock juries.”).
113. E.g., VIDMAR, supra note 67, at 226-28; Viscusi, supra note 83, at 124.
114. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J.
71, 85-97 (2000) (discussing group polarization).
115. Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 PSYCHOL. REV.
687, 713 (1996); Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Jurors vs. Bias in Juries: New Evidence from the SDS Perspective, 80 ORG’L BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 70, 82 (1999) (“For the jury, our findings confirm what is evident in the empirical record—that there is probably no general answer to the question
‘which is more biased, jurors or juries?’ The answer to this question must be ‘it depends.’”); see, e.g.,
Dagmar Stahlberg & Frank Eller, We Knew It All Along: Hindsight Bias in Groups, 63 ORG’L BEHAV. &
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 46, 56 (1995) (finding that “groups are as prone to hindsight bias as individuals when making hypothetical predictions,” but rejecting the suggestion of greater hindsight bias in
groups). For studies finding benefits of jury deliberations, see, for example, Kamala London & Narina
Nunez, The Effect of Jury Deliberations on Jurors’ Propensity to Disregard Inadmissible Evidence, 85 J.
APPLIED PSYCHOL. 932, 937 (2000) (“[S]tudies find that individuals are biased when exposed to inadmissible evidence. However, the results [here], as well as results from other research, suggest that jury deliberations may somehow moderate the effect of biasing factors.”); James H. Davis et al., Effects of Group
Size and Procedural Influence on Consensual Judgments of Quantity: The Example of Damage Awards
and Mock Civil Juries, 73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 703, 714 (1997) (reporting the “surprising”
result that “groups awarded less than preferred by parallel individuals working alone, although this difference is only marginally significant”). See generally MICHAEL J. SAKS, SMALL-GROUP DECISION MAKING
AND COMPLEX INFORMATION TASKS 3 (1981) (“The legal fact-finding task, especially in complex cases,
seems to be of the type in which, ceteris paribus, large heterogeneous groups perform better than individuals.”).
116. E.g., Shari Seidman Diamond & Jonathan D. Casper, Blindfolding the Jury to Verdict Consequences: Damages, Experts, and the Civil Jury, 26 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 513, 553-57 (1992); Martin F.
Kaplan & Charles E. Miller, Group Decision Making and Normative Versus Informational Influence:
Effects of Type of Issue and Assigned Decision Rule, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 306, 311
(1987).
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ior as worthy of strong punishment, deliberation increased the overall jury
rating; when individual jurors rated behavior as worthy only of weak punishment, deliberation tended to decrease the overall jury rating.117 As applied to
punitive damages, when individual jurors favored large awards of punitive damages, deliberations increased the amount awarded by the jury. Indeed, Schkade
et al. reported that 27% of mock juries voting to award punitive damages
awarded amounts as great or greater than the highest individual award before
deliberations.118 Similar effects have been identified in studies of decisionmaking by federal appellate courts.119
Thus, at least some evidence indicates that group deliberations do not
reduce and may actually heighten the effects of cognitive illusions on decisionmaking. Other evidence suggests that deliberations might moderate such
effects.120 The bottom line is uncertain.
B. Markets and Incentives
Jurors are selected randomly and paid a small, fixed fee.121 Their “financial
incentive to conduct a careful sifting of the evidence is nil.”122 Arbitrators, by
comparison, get paid only if selected to serve, and must compete with other
arbitrators to be selected. This market competition gives arbitrators different
incentives from juries, which may improve the quality of their decisionmaking
by inducing greater care.123
The broader question is whether these sorts of market forces are sufficient
to mitigate the effects of heuristics and cognitive biases. Richard Posner writes
that “[t]he literature on [cognitive] illusions provides some basis for thinking
that market settings tend to dispel or at least reduce them.”124 Selection effects
117. David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1139,
1140 (2000).
118. Id. at 1155-56 (finding 10% were higher than the highest individual award and 17% equal to the
highest individual award). They also found greater variability in awards by deliberating juries, and concluded: “This finding suggests, though it certainly does not prove, the possibility that juries will produce
more variability in awards than judges (a suggestion supported by the possibility that judicial experience
with a wider range of cases will introduce the equivalent of a ‘modulus’ by which to discipline dollar
awards).” Id. at 1148 n.43.
119. See Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine:
Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1755 (1997).
120. See supra note 115.
121. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 111, at 269, tbl. 40.
122. Posner, supra note 95, at 1497. This is not to say that juries do not take their responsibilities seriously, merely that they have no financial incentive to do so.
123. See, e.g., GORDON TULLOCK, TRIALS ON TRIAL 127-33 (1980); Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives
of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUB. CHOICE 107, 107 (1983); Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld,
Trial Courts: An Economic Perspective, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 533, 545 (1990); Christopher R. Drahozal,
Judicial Incentives and the Appeals Process, 51 SMU L. REV. 469, 502 (1998); Stephen Walt, Decision by
Division: The Contractarian Structure of Commercial Arbitration, 51 RUTGERS L. REV. 369, 411 (1999).
124. Posner, supra note 95, at 1494; see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 150 (“In some circumstances,
market forces are indeed strong enough to make behavioral economics irrelevant for predictive purposes.
Then the question becomes whether it is possible to identify those circumstances. This is a large question,
and we lack authoritative answers.”). For a pair of recent studies, see John A. List, Does Market Experi-
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that reduce cognitive illusions are more likely in market settings,125 and the
greater amount at stake may lead to less biased results than experimental studies find, although the evidence on this point is uncertain.126 Other commentators, however, are skeptical that the market has sufficient corrective effect.127
Moreover, competition among arbitrators also gives rise to the possibility of
“repeat player” bias, in which arbitrators have an incentive to favor parties who
are more likely to provide future business.128 To date, however, the evidence is
inconclusive on whether such bias exists.129
Lisa Bingham found a “repeat player effect” in a sample of 270 AAA
employment arbitration awards issued in 1993 and 1994.130 Employees were
awarded some recovery in 63% of all awards, but in only 16% of awards against
repeat player employers—which Bingham defined as employers who were parties to more than one award in the sample. Employees recovered 48% of their
demands against non-repeat player employers, but only 11% of their demands
against repeat player employers.131 Bingham made clear that there were several
possible explanations for these results, including that there were “systematic
differences in the merits of these cases, in that employees in repeat player cases

ence Eliminate Market Anomalies?, 118 Q.J. ECON. 41, 70 (2003) (“I find strong evidence that individual
behavior converges to the neoclassical prediction as trading experience intensifies.”); JOHN A. LIST,
NEOCLASSICAL THEORY VERSUS PROSPECT THEORY: EVIDENCE FROM THE MARKETPLACE 3 (Nat’l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9736, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9736
(“Overall, the data pattern observed suggests that the learning process at work is one where the psychological effects at the heart of prospect theory are gradually attenuated: experienced agents are more
willing to part with their endowments than lesser-experienced agents.”).
125. See supra text accompanying notes 41-42.
126. See, e.g., Vernon L. Smith & James M. Walker, Monetary Rewards and Decision Cost in Experimental Economics, 31 ECON. INQUIRY 245, 259 (1993) (“A survey of experimental papers which report
data on the comparative effects of subject monetary awards (including no rewards) shows a tendency for
the error variance of the observations around the predicted optimal level to decline with increased monetary reward.”); Dan N. Stone & David A. Ziebart, A Model of Financial Incentive Effects in Decision
Making, 61 ORG’L BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 250, 259 (1995) (“[R]esults support the contention that financial incentives are no panacea for eliminating decision biases. Instead, incentives appear
to increase the extent of attention given to a task, but also to increase potentially distracting emotions.”).
See generally Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A
Review and Capital-Labor-Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 8 (1999) (“The studies
show the effects of incentives are mixed and complicated.”); Mitchell, Equal Incompetence, supra note 5,
at 71-80 (“Sometimes decisions with material consequences are the same as decisions without material
consequences; sometimes they are different.”).
127. E.g., Langevoort, supra note 5, at 1523.
128. E.g., Rau, supra note 48, at 521-29; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 60-61; Sternlight, supra note 1, at
685. See generally Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95 (1974). As Gordon Tullock has explained, however, the incentive of
arbitrators to please repeat players does not necessarily mean that they will rule in favor of the repeat
players. TULLOCK, supra note 123, at 127-28 (“[A] bias toward the [repeat-player] retailer might be the
arbitrator’s profit-maximizing course of action. It might not, however, because the retailer might be interested in his general reputation and want an arbitrator who was either impartial or, for that matter, actually
pro-customer.”).
129. Walt, supra note 123, at 418.
130. Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 46, at 189-90.
131. Id. at 213.
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may have weaker legal claims, while employees in the non-repeat player cases
may have stronger legal claims.”132
In a follow-up study based on 203 AAA employment arbitration awards
from 1993 to 1995, Bingham obtained similar results.133 She concluded, however, that “these patterns largely correspond with differences in the nature of
the basis for arbitration.” According to Bingham, “[r]epeat player employers
get to arbitration based on an implied contract stemming from a personnel
manual or employee handbook,” cases in which the employee “may have a substantively weaker legal claim.”134 In short, the repeat player effect Bingham has
identified seems to have had more to do with the strength of the repeat player
employer’s claim (and, perhaps, ability to screen cases) than with the incentives
facing the arbitrator. In a subsequent study, Bingham and Simon Sarraf compared outcomes before and after the Employment Due Process Protocol,135 and
found that “employers arbitrating pursuant to an adhesive personnel handbook
arbitration clause are less successful in employment arbitration after the Protocol than before.”136 They concluded that “[s]elf-regulation through the Due
Process Protocol is making a difference in the outcomes of employment arbitration.”137
Thus, the available empirical evidence on the relationship between markets
and arbitral decisionmaking is inconclusive. While there is reason to believe
that market forces may reduce the effect of cognitive illusions on arbitral decisionmaking, the results of existing studies are far from conclusive. Conversely,
while arbitrators may have an incentive to favor repeat players in their awards,
the limited evidence of a repeat player effect seems to be due to case selection
by the parties and not bias on the part of the arbitrators. Overall, then, no
definitive answer is possible.
C. Other Differences
There are a variety of other structural differences between arbitration proceedings and jury trials that could correct for, or exacerbate, the effect of cognitive illusions on legal decisionmaking. The following are a sample.

132. Id.
133. Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power, supra note 46, at 38-39; see also Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 46, at 223.
134. Bingham, Unequal Bargaining Power, supra note 46, at 39-40.
135. TASK FORCE ON ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN EMPLOYMENT, A DUE PROCESS
PROTOCOL FOR MEDIATION AND ARBITRATION OF STATUTORY DISPUTES ARISING OUT OF THE
EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP (1995), available at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid=15717&JSP
src=upload/LIVESITE/focusArea/employment/protocol.html. The Protocol establishes minimum standards of procedural fairness for employment arbitration proceedings. The American Arbitration Association was involved in the drafting of the Protocol. The AAA states that its employment arbitration rules
comply with the Protocol and that it may refuse to administer arbitration proceedings under any program
that “substantially and materially” departs from the Protocol. AM. ARBITRATION ASS’N, NATIONAL
RULES FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES (effective Nov. 1, 2002).
136. Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 46; see also Bingham, Self-Determination, supra note 46, at 873.
137. Bingham & Sarraf, supra note 46.
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1. Fees
To file a lawsuit, a plaintiff merely pays a small filing fee (in addition to
paying his or her own lawyer, on a contingency basis or otherwise).138 No other
charge is made by the public court system; judges’ salaries and other administrative costs are paid by the government. By comparison, a claimant filing a
demand for arbitration pays fees both to any arbitration institution providing
administrative services and to the arbitrator or arbitrators resolving the dispute.139 As a general matter, the fees are graduated, increasing as the amount
sought by the claimant increases.
The policy discussions140 and court cases141 dealing with arbitration fees consider the extent to which such fees might preclude individuals from asserting
claims in arbitration. The focus here, however, is on a different consequence of
arbitration fees: their effect on party behavior in the arbitration proceeding. As
discussed above, a number of experimental studies have found that the amounts
claimed by plaintiffs have a strong anchoring effect on jury verdicts.142 In court,
the plaintiff has little financial incentive to moderate damages claims. In arbitration, however, a claimant has a significant financial incentive to be realistic
about damages claims because of the graduated fees charged by most arbitration institutions.143 Claimants who ask for more have to pay more, which may
counteract to some degree any bias resulting from anchoring on the amount
sought.144
2. Rules of Evidence
Detailed rules govern the admissibility and presentation of evidence in
court. By contrast, formal rules of evidence ordinarily do not apply in arbitration.145 Further, despite having the power to exclude irrelevant evidence,146 arbi138. E.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, THE COSTS OF ARBITRATION 43 (2002), available at
http://www.publiccitizen.org/documents/ACF110A.pdf.
139. 1 IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 3.2.2.2, at 3:13 (1999).
140. E.g., PUBLIC CITIZEN’S CONGRESS WATCH, supra note 138, at 42; Paul D. Carrington & Paul H.
Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 331, 384-85; Schwartz, supra note 3, at 61.
141. E.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000); Morrison v. Circuit City Stores,
Inc., 317 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 2003); Cole v. Burns Int’l Sec. Servs., 105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
142. See supra Part II.A.2.
143. The fee structure in arbitration provides an alternative explanation for Maltby’s findings, see
supra text accompanying notes 61-63, that arbitration claimants recover a higher percentage of their
demands than do plaintiffs in federal court. See CHRISTOPHER R. DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION: CASES AND PROBLEMS 7 (2002) (“Given that the fees parties pay in arbitration are based
on the amount demanded, [Maltby’s] numbers may reflect no more than the fact that parties in arbitration
have a strong incentive to be more realistic about their initial demands than parties in court.”).
144. Of course, arbitration fees may be higher or lower than necessary to result in an optimal damage
claim by the claimant.
145. See, e.g., AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 110, Rule R-31(a); NATIONAL
ARBITRATION FORUM CODE OF PROCEDURE, Rule 35(C) (July 1, 2003); JAMS EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION RULES AND PROCEDURES, Rule 20(d) (revised Apr. 2003) [hereinafter JAMS
EMPLOYMENT RULES]. Parties can and sometimes do contract for rules of evidence to apply in arbitration proceedings, but such contract provisions are rare. See Drahozal, supra note 8, at 731 (reporting that
three clauses in a sample of thirty-four arbitration clauses in franchise agreements provided for the Federal Rules of Evidence to govern in arbitration proceedings).
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trators have a “well documented” tendency to “let it all in.”147 The gatekeeping
function of the trial judge over the admission of evidence “is one way of combating cognitive illusions.”148 For example, Federal Rule of Evidence 407, which
provides that evidence of subsequent remedial measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or other wrongful conduct,149 “reveals a good understanding
of . . . hindsight bias and the judicial ability to respond to it.”150 The absence of
rules of evidence in arbitration may increase the relative susceptibility of arbitral decisionmaking to hindsight bias.151
3. Appellate Review
Court rules provide for some degree of substantive oversight of jury verdicts, such as by permitting judges to grant a new trial or a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.152 Courts exercise especially stringent scrutiny over awards
of punitive damages.153 Indeed, studies show that a significant percentage of
punitive damages awards by juries are modified or set aside,154 suggesting that
courts take their supervisory role seriously. Both jury verdicts and bench-trial
verdicts are subject to review by appellate courts, with factual findings subject
to some degree of deference and legal issues reviewable de novo. The availability of appellate review may correct errors resulting from cognitive biases,155
give judges the incentive to avoid errors in the first place,156 and provide feedback useful in avoiding future errors.157 By comparison, only very limited

146. See, e.g., AAA COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES, supra note 110, Rule R-31(b); JAMS
EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 145, Rule 20(d).
147. 3 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 139, § 35.1.2.4, at 35:9.
148. Posner, supra note 95, at 1494.
149. FED. R. EVID. 407.
150. Rachlinski, supra note 14, at 617-18. Rachlinski argues, however, that as a general matter keeping
evidence from the jury “probably cannot cure the hindsight bias” because “[t]o avoid the influence of the
bias, the evidence that needs to be suppressed is the very fact that some adverse event led to a lawsuit.”
Id. at 605.
151. Cf. Posner, supra note 95, at 1494 (“If judges as well as jurors are prone to make cognitive errors
or be overcome by emotion, trial by jury may actually proceed more rationally than trial by judge, since in
a bench trial there is no gatekeeper protecting the trier of fact from confusing or excessively prejudicial
evidence.”).
152. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 59; see also SWARD, supra note 12, at 271-99.
153. E.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003); BMW of N. Am., Inc. v.
Gore, 517 U.S. 559 (1986).
154. E.g., W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 94 (1991) (concluding that “plaintiffs
received only . . . 29% of the original punitive award” due to reduction on appeal or settlement after verdict); Neil Vidmar et al., Jury Awards for Medical Malpractice and Post-verdict Adjustment of Those
Awards, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 265 (1998) (finding many outlier compensatory damage verdicts reduced
after verdict).
155. Steven Shavell, The Appeals Process as a Means of Error Correction, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 379
(1995).
156. Drahozal, supra note 123, at 492.
157. David A. Schkade, Erratic by Design: A Task Analysis of Punitive Damages Assessment, 39
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 121, 130 (2002) (“Jurors get neither rewards nor feedback based on their decisions.”)
(italics omitted).
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appellate review is available for arbitration awards.158 Courts will vacate awards
only on narrow procedural grounds159 or for manifest disregard of the law.160
Thus, in arbitration there is far less opportunity to avoid any errors resulting
from heuristics or cognitive biases through appellate review than there is in
court.161
V
CONCLUSION
Businesses cite arbitration as a way to avoid aberrant jury verdicts, implicitly
if not explicitly assuming that arbitrators make “better” decisions than juries.
By contrast, consumer advocates criticize arbitration as a way for businesses to
avoid paying damages to deserving claimants, effectively assuming that juries
make better decisions than arbitrators. These conflicting perspectives pose an
important question in the debate over predispute arbitration clauses in consumer contracts: How do decisions by arbitrators compare to decisions by
juries?
From a behavioral perspective, arbitral decisionmaking appears to be less
subject to cognitive illusions than decisionmaking by juries. This is not an
across-the-board conclusion about the superiority of arbitral decisionmaking,
but rather a tentative conclusion about the effect of heuristics and cognitive
biases on two modes of legal decisionmaking. It is based largely on experimental studies of decisionmaking by judges, and it recognizes that the comparison
between judges and arbitrators is not perfect and that drawing real-world conclusions from experimental results is difficult. If arbitral decisionmaking in fact
proves to be less subject to cognitive illusions than jury decisionmaking, it
would provide some evidence that arbitrators may make “better,” or at least no
worse, decisions than juries.
The most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this analysis, however, is that
more research is needed on how cognitive illusions affect arbitral decisionmaking. Commentators have already called for studies on the psychology of dispute
resolution in the international arbitration context.162 Neil Vidmar and Lisa
158. Parties may, however, provide by contract for an appellate arbitral tribunal. See, e.g., JAMS
EMPLOYMENT RULES, supra note 145, Rule 30 & Optional Arbitration Appeal Procedure.
159. See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2000 & Supp. 2003). See generally 4 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 139, § 40
(discussing the grounds for vacating arbitration awards).
160. See Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953) (“[T]he interpretations of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard are not subject, in the federal courts, to judicial review for error in
interpretation.”)
161. For an incentives-based explanation for the lack of an appeals process in commercial arbitration,
see Drahozal, supra note 123, at 502.
162. See Shari Seidman Diamond, The Psychological Aspects of Dispute Resolution: Issues for International Arbitration, in INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: IMPORTANT CONTEMPORARY
QUESTIONS 327, 342 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed., 2003) (suggesting a research agenda that would “systematically observe . . . and analyze . . . actual behavior and the decision-making process” in international
arbitration, comparable to recent study of jury deliberations); Christopher R. Drahozal, Of Rabbits and
Rhinoceri: A Survey of Empirical Research on International Commercial Arbitration, 20 J. INT’L ARB. 23,
32-33 (2003).
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Bingham have both used arbitrators as experimental subjects while examining
other issues.163 Studies of cognitive illusions in the context of consumer arbitration would be of great interest and practical importance as well.
Experimental studies have the clear benefit of holding constant the facts
facing the decisionmaker. Problems would need to be developed (preferably
with significant detail and context provided to the decisionmaker) to test for the
effect of various cognitive illusions, such as hindsight bias, anchoring, the representativeness heuristic, and extremeness aversion. Conferences attended by
arbitrators would be an obvious place to administer the problems. They also
could be administered by mail, although the response rate almost certainly
would be lower. To facilitate comparisons, the problems should be administered to mock jurors as well. Such experimental studies would provide a good
starting point for the behavioral analysis of arbitral decisionmaking, as well as
contributing to a comparison of decisionmaking by arbitrators and juries.164

163. Lisa B. Bingham & Debra J. Mesch, Decision Making in Employment and Labor Arbitration, 39
INDUS. REL. 671 (2000) (reporting the results of an experimental study comparing labor and employment
arbitrators); see Vidmar & Rice, supra note 42, at 890-91.
164. Studies of outcomes in arbitration proceedings, testing for the effect of cognitive illusions, likewise
would be of interest, but would be far more difficult to design. Problems of case selection and ensuring
comparable facts make studies of arbitration outcomes—particularly any attempts to compare arbitration
awards to jury verdicts—highly problematic. See, e.g., Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer: Empirical
and Other Approaches to the Study of Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 757
(2001) (“Empirical studies are vulnerable to the possibility that the studied cases going to arbitration are
systematically different from the studied cases going to litigation. This will remain true as long as the law
allows contracts to determine whether or not a case goes to arbitration.”).

